

## OPORDs and Leadership: Complicating Simplicity

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*The only new thing in the world is the history you don't know.*

—Harry S. Truman<sup>1</sup>

Something remarkable occurred (by today's military standards) just before Operation Market Garden during World War II. British Army Lieutenant General B.G. Horrocks stood before his commanders and, using a map, briefed them on the operations order (OPORD). The XXX Corps commander articulated the mission, defined its primary and intermediate objectives, assigned tasks to subordinates and, using an analogy to American Westerns, explained the concept of the operation. In just under 10 minutes, Horrocks had issued orders for the ground phase of the largest airborne operation in the history of warfare.

When preparing to retake Cyrenaica in North Africa during World War II, German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel published a 21-paragraph OPORD with "each paragraph, on average, containing only seven lines of typescript."<sup>2</sup> In 8 days Rommel pushed the British back to Gazala and regained the initiative in North Africa. Five months later he took Tobruk.<sup>3</sup> No hint exists that Rommel's commanders lacked crucial information or failed to understand the mission, the concept of operation, or essential tasks.

### Orders: Publish or Perish

Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz describes war as supremely simple.<sup>4</sup> Today's masters of operational and strategic arts believe information proliferation, technological advances, and the urban battlefield have created an asymmetrical threat that changes the nature of warfare. Such a threat, they claim, is much too complex to defeat without PowerPoint™ briefings; information operations (IO) themes and

messages; effects-based operations; endless meetings; lengthy, overly detailed OPORDs; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Historian Victor Davis Hanson compares this notion to a water pump, warning that no matter how advanced a water pump becomes, it does not bring forth a novel liquid.<sup>5</sup>

The U.S. Army's principles of war (objective, offense, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and *simplicity*) are essential to success in combat but apparently lack the nuance and political sensitivity deemed essential to the police actions of nationbuilding.

Military force is a blunt instrument. Policymakers should embrace this reality rather than radically alter traditional, battle-proven military structures. Clausewitz reminds us: "[T]he soldier is levied, clothed, armed, and trained—he sleeps, eats, drinks, marches—merely to fight at the right place and the right time."<sup>6</sup> Soldiers are not policemen. Armies are not police forces.

For its part, the U.S. Army needs to simplify its methods, reduce its staffs, shift leadership paradigms, and transform in the right rather than the wrong places. The nature of warfare has not changed, even in this era of nationbuilding. Success in battle, whether in high- or low-intensity conflict, still hinges on the principles of war. Instead of a facelift through a force-restructuring scheme akin to robbing Peter to pay Paul, the Army needs to lose weight by changing how it does business and by returning to battle-proven methods and organizational and leadership principles.

Before redeploying for Operation Iraqi Freedom, V Corps suffered a

50 percent turnover in staff. Key positions from the corps commander, chief of staff, deputy chief of operations, and deputy chief of plans and exercises as well as the G-staff primaries and secondaries were filled by new officers only weeks before V Corps' mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) and mere months before deployment. These officers did not participate in the train-up for the MRX and received only a few weeks training during the MRX to become familiar with the corps' standing operating procedures (SOPs) and their functions, which is not the best way to create a cohesive team able to react efficiently to the commander's will.

Aside from the problems in continuity such turnover causes, consider the staff's size as V Corps expanded into Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), then imagine the volume of paper and briefs these organizations produced. About 120 officers were on the V Corps staff, 200 were on the MNC-I staff, and hundreds of noncommissioned officers and soldiers augmented and supported them.

What the staffs lacked in efficiency because of their size, they made up for in the volume of orders and briefs they produced. Within a year V Corps produced 4 OPORDs and over 500 fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), averaging 60 pages per OPORD and 4 pages per FRAGO (for a total of 2,000 pages)—just for training exercises and unit deployments—and hundreds of PowerPoint™ slides for briefing after briefing. MNC-I recently published an 82-page effects-based OPORD with attached annexes running into the hundreds of pages.

All this activity demonstrates a publish-or-perish mentality that epitomizes Parkinson's Law: Work

expands so as to fill the time available for its completion. Thousands of man-hours go into producing lengthy documents with details ad nauseum. Such documents are ignored or, if read, either overwhelm subordinates or confuse them and, in any case, fall by the wayside when the first shot is fired. It is one of the marvels of the Information Age that Army generals are concerning themselves with innumerable "eaches, theses, and thats" of unit structure and operations.

By comparison, locked into position for a year during the extensive train-up in England before Operation Overlord began, the V Corps staff produced half the paperwork the MNC-I V Corps staff produced. The number of soldiers without two pairs of boots in 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, A Company, 1-16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, was not a war-stopper issue worthy of the corps commander's attention. Which organization, V Corps then or V Corps now, was more prepared, efficient, and cohesive?

### Other Voices, Other Armies

Consider the command and staff relationships other professional armies practiced in combat. Rommel biographer David Fraser notes: "The Germans traditionally believed staffs should be formed as self-sufficient cells, with individuals understanding each other's methods and requirements, able to respond to battle and the commander's will in battle like a brain and a nervous system."<sup>7</sup> The emphasis was on developing well-trained, integrated staffs that, when preserved as units, were familiar with their commanders' abilities and leadership styles.<sup>8</sup>

Because of its training and continuity, a small, specialized staff can efficiently process and analyze reports, glean critical information for the commander's use, manage logistics and communications to support his orders, and keep subordinate commanders apprised of the battle-field situation. A specialized staff, by its nature, brings together expertise. If a chief of staff or executive officer with a broad appreciation of the tactical or strategic picture manages that expertise, the staff can focus on coordinating the battlespace and maintaining logistical support.

Fraser notes: "[The Wehrmacht] rejected both the principle and practice of over-detailed orders," considering it a mistake for a staff to plan operations in detail because a staff often does not have the most up-to-date, relevant information about unit readiness and capability or fully appreciate the actual conditions on the ground.<sup>9</sup>

How often do subordinate commanders brief a status different from the staff picture? How often do subordinate commands report an enemy situation different from that of the G2's? The Germans believed a commander "should be given the simplest of instructions and objectives and be set free to discharge his mission as appears to him best," which put the emphasis on the commander executing his mission based on firsthand knowledge of his unit and the current situation, not on speculation from on high as to enemy intentions or on inaccurate status reports.<sup>10</sup>

The staff worked diligently in the background to meet support requirements as the battle developed. The Wehrmacht spent little time fretting over logistics, speculating about enemy courses of action, or developing detailed schemes of maneuver for plans that would not survive contact.<sup>11</sup> Instead, it emphasized engaging the enemy at the level where the real fighting occurs and massing combat power at the decisive point to accomplish the mission. Clausewitz observes that plans and orders change as soon as fighting begins, and success in battle depends solely on the commander's talent.<sup>12</sup> Napoleon is more succinct: "The art of war is simple; everything is a matter of execution."<sup>13</sup> No one reasons. Everyone executes.

The following vignette illustrates Napoleon's maxim. Marshal Michel Ney complained to Napoleon that Napoleon's staff was swamping him with paperwork. Ney asked Napoleon, "What do you want? Answers to the endless inquiries of your staff or for me to execute your orders?" Napoleon told Ney to concern himself only with his orders and put away the staff correspondence for a month. At month's end, Ney cracked the seals on the staff correspondence, opened and read the letters, and when directives were not

overcome by events, he answered the mail. Ney never responded again to lengthy staff inquiries.

The Grande Armée and the Wehrmacht were not the only armies to adopt such practices. In the U.S. Army's 4th Armored Division (the spearhead of General George Patton's Third Army) the staff SOP directed that no OPORD exceed one page. If needed, a map could be drawn on the back of that one page. This illustrates an axiom attributed to Patton: "Don't tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do, and let them surprise you with their results."<sup>14</sup> Patton took only one operations and intelligence briefing a day while on campaign in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The briefing lasted no more than 45 minutes, and then Patton was off to the front.

If Patton is too much of a renegade to emulate in command and staff methods, consider VII Corps Major General J. Lawton "Lighting Joe" Collins. His Order 18 (to expand the Remagen Bridgehead and attack into the industrial heartland of Germany) was only 4 pages long with 3 short annexes: an operations overlay, an intelligence annex, and a fire-support annex. The 1997 draft of Field Manual 101-5, *Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs*, states: "Especially notable is the brevity and simplicity of the basic order. Such simplicity and brevity reflect the combat-tested experience and SOPs of VII Corps and the divisions within First U.S. Army."<sup>15</sup> Of course, such brevity and simplicity require the commander to be at the front assessing the situation for himself and acting according to his skill and judgment.

Contrast these orders and command practices with those of stability operations and support operations (SOSO) in Iraq. For one specific SOSO task, such as targeting, the staff produces dozens of slides (linked to voluminous target folders) for use in targeting boards and coordination meetings resulting in multiple-page FRAGOs that direct operations against a single target. Supposedly major combat operations are far less complex than SOSO, especially within the coalition environment, so the commander needs real-time feeds, information

dominance, and civil-military affairs savvy. Perhaps. The perceived requirements were no different for commanders during the occupation of Germany, but the plan for Operation Eclipse was concise (two phases, with a mere five objectives in Phase II, and not a single slide detailing execution).<sup>16</sup> How such simple plans and staff work ever pacified a nation of 60 million, kept the trains running on time, the lights on, the people fed, and the sewage treatment plants operating is hard to imagine, but they did.

The reconstruction of postwar Germany and its governance within a coalition framework (with one power decidedly hostile to the interests of the United States and England, and I am not referring to the French) seems every bit as complex as nationbuilding in Iraq, a country with one-third the population. How could a military with no satellite communications, tactical local area network, or unmanned aerial vehicles, and with virtually no C4ISR capabilities, publish simple orders for complex operations with nothing close to the information dominance enjoyed by today's forces in Iraq? One would think the relationship inverse.

### Managers and Numbers

When a military develops a corporate mentality, the name of the game is no longer leadership, it is management—a fatal shift. Herein lies the rub. Only numbers matter to a manager. Numbers are manageable. If we can reduce a problem to numbers, then we can put the problem into a computer and derive a solution quickly and efficiently. Therefore, managers place great emphasis on measures of effectiveness and performance. Working groups meet to massage the numbers, lengthy briefs explain the numbers, and detailed orders disseminate the numbers.

SOSO revolve around numbers. If 20 Iraqis join the Iraqi National Guard today, 10 tomorrow, and 5 the next day, Iraqis must lack confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces. If 5 sheiks today, 10 tomorrow, and 20 the next day roll over on insurgents, local support for the insurgency is declining. If a majority of Iraqis surveyed say they have confidence

in the constitutional process, then the IO themes and messages are working. There is no limit to the spin we can put on numbers. At the rate operations are managed in Iraq, it is not surprising to see the resurrection of something akin to the Vietnam-era Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES).<sup>17</sup> If nothing else, the HES made pacification efforts quantifiable, Vietnamization manageable. Still, despite the glossy numbers, the plan was a total failure. One glance at the MNC-I's 180-slide "Effects Assessment Board" gives one the sinking feeling that history is repeating itself.

The U.S. Army is fighting an insurgency—regardless of the euphemistic terms we attach to it. Corporate suits require management with the veneer of leadership; warriors require leadership with only the veneer of management. Armies engaged in combat operations need real leadership. Rear Admiral Grace Hopper reminds us no one ever managed men into battle.<sup>18</sup> The litany of boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups that dominate SOSO briefs might make the counterinsurgency fight manageable, but they offer little in the way of a quick, decisive, lasting victory. Only someone with a genius for war can produce such results. Napoleon asserts: "In war, men are nothing; one man is everything."<sup>19</sup>

Groupthink and bureaucracy do not encourage original ideas or reward innovation. Historian Hugh Nibley, a veteran of Normandy, finds management feeds on mediocrity, and no manager is about to promote anyone whose competence threatens his own position.<sup>20</sup> Nibley notes that for a hundred years the German Generalstab desperately tried to train leaders for the German Army, "but it never worked, because the men who delighted their superiors; that is, the managers, got the high commands, while the men who delighted the lower ranks; that is, the leaders, got reprimands."<sup>21</sup> It is no wonder that 60 years later Master of Public Administration programs hail Max Weber, a bureaucrat, for his administrative acuity and ignore Rommel, one of the Great Captains, despite his battle-tested leadership. The U.S. Army embraces the management practices espoused in the Nation's

leading universities and corporations and shuns Rommel and Patton in its training courses. For an officer to emulate Patton in today's Army guarantees at least a reprimand, if not a short career.

No one is more attuned to the shifting winds of office politics than the manager, in whose view the problem is always complex and in need of the nuances of management. The solution is to be found within the lines through regulations, flowcharts, and working groups—all of which require the manager's rigid oversight in order to arrive at a "right" (politically acceptable and, therefore, safe) solution—a solution that only suffices until the next crisis or meeting. The manager reacts to all things and averts none.

### Caesar and Patton

By contrast, observes Nibley, leadership is an escape from mediocrity.<sup>22</sup> To a true leader, a problem is never too complex and the solution is simple. Leaders retain the initiative. Julius Caesar was never disconcerted; he always knew exactly what to do, and did it. Gallic chieftains fomenting rebellion? Hunt them down and kill them. Gauls foolish enough to have joined the warlords and taken up arms against Caesar's legions? Lop off their hands.<sup>23</sup> Now *there* was an IO campaign! Caesar came, saw, conquered. To the agitators, death; to the populace, resistance is unsustainable. Gaul is pacified, absorbed into the Empire, and prospers, never to threaten Rome again. Ironically, for this achievement the Roman Senate denounced Caesar as a criminal.

So that we would not mistake his actions for wanton brutality, Caesar explains that he "knew his leniency was universally known, and so he was not afraid that if he acted somewhat harshly he would appear to have done so out of any innate cruelty. . . . For this reason he decided upon making an example of the townspeople in punishing them, so as to deter the rest. He allowed them to live, therefore, but cut off the hands of all those who had carried arms against him. This made the punishment for wrongdoers plain to see."<sup>24</sup>

In addition to making an example out of the insurgents, Caesar



deprived them of the means to resist: he broke their will. He knew he could kill them until he rotted and get nowhere, but if he attacked their will to fight, he could break the resistance (and did). Of course, CNN was not present to broadcast such deeds into the living rooms of every Roman and Gaul. Today, the screams of Soccer Moms, college professors, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Europeans would be unbearable. So even if the sensibilities of most Americans were not greatly offended by such Draconian measures, we would be made to feel that they had been. In fact, lopping off hands is not an unusual punishment in the Arab world where thieves suffer this fate as rote justice. The howl from the Arab street would presumably only be outrage at infidels doing the deed rather than their own oppressive regimes.

If Caesar's remedy to insurgency was a bit Draconian, consider what the U.S. Army did with the Germans after World War II. When martial law was declared, two simple rules applied to every German: surrender all firearms or suffer the pain of death; violate curfew and suffer the pain of death.<sup>25</sup> The official U.S. Army history of the occupation of Germany notes: "The army-type occupation was comprehensive and showed the Germans that they were defeated and their country occupied."<sup>26</sup> Germany was pacified. Such a simple solution to such a complex problem could only be the product of leaders not overly concerned with domestic politics, world opinion, or the Aryan street, the 1945 equivalent of today's Arab street.

Comparing leaders and managers, Nibley observes that "leaders are movers and shakers, original, inventive, unpredictable, imaginative, and full of surprises that discomfit the enemy in war and the main office in peace, [and] managers are safe, conservative, predictable, conforming organization men and team players, dedicated to the establishment."<sup>27</sup>

Leaders are also practical-minded, politically incorrect, and not afraid to do what is necessary on their own initiative when circumstances dictate. Caesar conquers Gaul because he must. If Rome is afraid, consumed by petty politics, and indecisive, Caesar is not. Patton

directs his commanders to attack toward Bastogne. If Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force is disconcerted by Adolph Hitler's Ardennes counteroffensive, Patton is not. Who else other than Patton was practical-minded enough to employ Nazis to keep the railroads running and the sewage systems operating during the occupation of Germany? If Washington is consumed by hubris over de-Nazification, Patton is not. Would any general today harangue his troops as "sons of bitches" or contravene orders from Washington during politically sensitive SOSO?

To some it appears baffling that the crass, chauvinistic Patton, who led an army to victory over Nazi Germany, and considered himself morally superior to such an enemy, became an effective administrator of postwar Germany. Today's Army is not that of 1944, and it shows. To act as Patton did would be to commit career suicide, which is unthinkable for a manager who defines achievement as advancement and believes the best way to advance is to play it safe.

Vision is a dangerous thing to management. Visionaries rock the boat. "True leaders are inspiring," explains Nibley, "because they are inspired, caught up in a higher purpose."<sup>28</sup> Whether that purpose is just or not, or right or wrong, suffice it to say that such a leader is idealistic and driven—sometimes by a belief in destiny. Why else would Patton, as biographer Carlo D'Este notes, tromp around the backroads of Normandy while on leave from the front in World War I believing one day he would lead armored forces in a mighty and desperate struggle through that very terrain?<sup>29</sup>

Not long ago, a retired Army Chief of Staff, touring the Gettysburg battlefield, appeared on PBS *Frontline Reports* and drew the conclusion that the Army must transform into a more agile, lighter force.<sup>30</sup> There are many lessons to draw from Gettysburg, but the need for a transformation from heavy, tracked armor to light, wheeled armor capable of rapid deployment by air transport is not one of them. Besides drawing inspiration from the wrong battle in the wrong war from this wrong era, the "revelation" is not inspiring. True leaders might

be egotistical, even delusional, but they have a sense of purpose and they instill that purpose in others without using erroneous historical contexts.

Two decades after his reconnaissance of northern France, Patton led an army across France and into the heart of Germany, engaging more enemy units, killing more Germans, and advancing farther and faster than any other army in the ETO. Europe is free from Nazi tyranny, and generations of Americans live in freedom thanks to Patton's military prowess. Greatness is not the product of a hypercompetitive corporate culture or "effects-assessment" metrics. Leadership is synonymous with achievement.

And so we return to where we began—to General Horrocks—a commander standing before his men, issuing his orders. Adroit observers of history note that before Operation Market Garden the British Army was caught up in laboriously producing detailed orders, but the rapid pace of mechanized and airborne warfare (two truly revolutionary developments in the history of war) overcame British staff practices. The British adapted to the requirements of modern warfare, a change that, combined with sound leadership, made the objective clear. An imperfect plan executed violently now is better than a perfect plan executed too late.

## War and the Water Pump

What we are doing is not novel. We just think it is. No matter how advanced our war machine gets, water still comes out of the water pump. The principles that govern war do not change by virtue of technology.

Not to belabor a point, but if the Third Army of 1944 had time-warped into Iraq to conduct Operation Iraqi Freedom, it could have defeated Saddam's army, and done so just as quickly as today's much more technologically advanced forces. The simple truth is that in the 60 years since World War II there has been no revolution in warfare. The air and tank attack tactics the Germans pioneered remain in use today; all we have done is perfect them.

Because of technology, modern

warfare is more lethal, not revolutionized, as it was by the machine-gun, the airplane, and the tank. We have come a long way from using the club as a weapon. By using nuclear weapons, we have reached a pinnacle in the ability to slaughter each other. Perhaps, we do not need to find yet another technological advance or organizational structure or tactical formation to revolutionize war. Clausewitz reminds us that the rapid, uninterrupted advance to a decisive conclusion is the aim of all combat operations. No conquest can be over too soon, so perhaps getting to a fight quickly is less important than winning the fight quickly once in it.

Clausewitz also says war is not an isolated event. War does not break out suddenly without warning. Indicators are always present.<sup>31</sup> We must be willing to acknowledge them. Because we have become too politically correct, we either dismiss what does not fit our preconceived notions, wish away bad news, or simply cannot handle the truth.

We stood by idly as the Nazi war machine steamrolled across Europe, North Africa, and the Russian steppes. The Japanese hopped from island to island in the Pacific and then took much of the Pacific Rim. We stood by until attacked, despite the indicators. Having foresight is not an American virtue, but innovation is. Hopefully, men capable of rising to the occasion—leaders like Patton—will be standing in the wings and will not have been driven out of our Army when we really need them to fight and win wars against a formidable conventional enemy we have wished away or claim does not exist.

We must get out of the weeds of management and return to battle-proven methods and leadership that prepare us to fight against modern, professional armies instead of praising ourselves for running over some rag-bag Arab army in only 21 days. **MR**

## NOTES

1. David McCullough, "Knowing History and Knowing Who We Are" (remarks at the Hillsdale College National Leadership Seminar on "American History and America's Future," Phoenix, Arizona, 15 February 2005), on-line at <www.hillsdale.edu/imprimis/2005/April/>, accessed 20 July 2005.

2. David Fraser, *Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995), 300.

3. Ibid., 302-303.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, *War, Politics, and Power:*

*Selections from On War, and I Believe and Profess*, trans. and ed., Edward M. Collins (Chicago: Gateway, 1962), 155.

5. Victor Davis Hanson, *An Autumn of War: What America Learned from September 11 and the War on Terrorism* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 124.

6. Clausewitz, 102.

7. Fraser, *Knight's Cross*, 273; Princeton historian Peter Paret observes in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, eds., Peter Paret and Gordon A. Craig (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 137, that "[b]ecause Napoleon insisted not only on one-man rule but also on one-man command, the operational core of his staff was never more than an organization for assembling information he required and for transmitting reports and orders. The staff neither generated strategic plans nor developed an institutional capacity for independent decisionmaking within the context of his strategic and operational intentions."

We seem reluctant to learn from the Wehrmacht because they lost World War II, and the mentality is, obviously, that their methods were flawed. However, it is necessary to point out that the German general staff's sentiments were not original. The influence was Napoleonic in origin, which follows because Clausewitz greatly admired Napoleon. Although Napoleon was a scoundrel—his genius for combined arms warfare notwithstanding—the Generalstab, despite rejecting most Clausewitzian theory as the war progressed, was still heavily influenced by Clausewitz. (Excuse the paradox.)

8. Ibid. The Germans considered large staffs the invariable sign of a poor army.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder, expressed the sentiment "no plan survives contact." See Daniel J. Hughes, ed., *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, trans., Hughes and Harry Bell (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993).

12. Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 100.

13. Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed., Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 127.

14. Porter B. Williamson, *Patton's Principles for Life and Leadership* (New York: Touchstone, 1998).

15. U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, *Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, draft, 1997), H-73.

16. Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, Army Historical Series, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1990), 163; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEP) (44) 34, Operation Eclipse, Appreciation and Outline Plan, 10 November 1944, in SHAEP G-5, 115.25A, Jacket 3.

The reader should note the difference in length and content between U.S. Central Command's campaign plan for Iraq and the directives SHAEP published for the administration of occupied Germany. The tone and tenor are strikingly different. Also, SHAEP, while reluctant to take on the governance of postwar Germany, did not wish away pacification. By mid-1943, planners had been anxious to develop contingency plans for occupation. Planning for the occupation began in earnest before the Normandy landings. By the time Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive 551 arrived at SHAEP, which directed the military governance mission, SHAEP was ahead of the game. Contingency Plan Rankin was revised throughout the summer of 1944 and put into execution as Operation Eclipse on 8 May 1945. Policy lagged behind, however, as President Harry S. Truman did not sign Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 until 10 May 1945, after the document went through about eight revisions.

17. The Hamlet Evaluation Survey was initiated by American Aid Chief Robert Komer. His theory was that it was possible to rate every hamlet or village in Vietnam in terms of security, from A to E. Such ratings had little meaning in guerrilla warfare.

18. RADM Grace Hopper, in Hugh Nibley, "Leaders to Managers: The Fatal Shift" (speech given at the commencement ceremony, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 19 August 1983). On-line at <http://farms.byu.edu/display.php?table=transcripts&id=125>, accessed 20 July 2005.

19. Napoleon Bonaparte, *Napoleon on the Art of War*, trans. and ed., Jay Luvaas (New York: Touchstone, 1999), 61.

20. Nibley.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid. Nibley's sentiment continues as follows: "The leader, for example, has a passion for equality. We think of great generals, from David and Alexander on down, as sharing their beans and matzah with their men, calling them by their first names, marching along with them in the heat,

sleeping on the ground, and being the first over the wall. A famous ode by a long-suffering Greek soldier, Archilochus, reminds us that the men in the ranks are not fooled for an instant by the executive type who thinks he is a leader.

"For the manager, on the other hand, the idea of equality is repugnant and even counterproductive. Where promotion, perks, privilege, and power are the name of the game, awe and reverence for rank is everything—the inspiration and motivation of all good men. Where would management be without the inflexible paper processing, dress standards, attention to proper social, political, and religious affiliation, vigilant watch over habits and attitudes that gratify the stockholders and satisfy security?"

"If you love me," said the greatest of all leaders, "you will keep my commandments." "If you know what is good for you," says the manager, "you will keep my commandments and not make waves." That is why the rise of management always marks the decline, alas, of culture.

23. Ibid. Nibley further observes that "[a]ll the great deposits of art, science, and literature from the past, on which all civilization has been nourished, come to us from a mere handful of leaders. For the qualities of leadership are the same in all fields, the leader being simply the one who sets the highest example; and to do that and open the way to greater light and knowledge, the leader must break the mold."

24. Gaius Julius Caesar, *The Gallic War*, trans., Carolyn Hammond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 217, 8.44.

25. LTC Wally Z. Walters, "The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace Against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Operations Against Saddam Hussein's Iraq," U.S. Army War College Research Project, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2002, 19; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, *Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany* (December 1944).

26. Ziemke, 320; Forrest C. Pogue, in *The Supreme Command*, Army Historical Series, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989), 357, notes that on 28 September 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower proclaimed: "The Allied Forces serving under my Command have now entered Germany. We come as conquerors, but not as oppressors. In the area of Germany occupied by the forces under my Command, we shall obliterate Nazism and German militarism. We shall overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi Party and abolish the cruel and oppressive and discriminatory laws and institutions which the party has created. We shall eradicate that German militarism which has so often disrupted the peace of the world. Military and party leaders, the Gestapo and others suspected of crimes and atrocities, will be tried, and if guilty, punished as they deserve." It is a shame such unequivocal statements are not forthcoming from today's military leaders regarding Iraq. Maybe the current quagmire might not exist if from the beginning we had called a spade a spade and acted accordingly.

27. Nibley.

28. Ibid.

29. Carlo D'Este, *Patton: A Genius for War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), xiii.

30. GEN Eric K. Shinseki, interview during "The Future of War," *Frontline* 1904K1, Public Broadcasting System, 24 October 2000. Shinseki's most telling comment was that "[t]he generals of the era just didn't get it." Indeed, And history has a funny way of repeating itself. The issue is not prognostication, preparation, being tradition bound, or even "fighting the last war." The issue is inspiration; where that inspiration is derived from; and what immortal feat it achieves. The mark of greatness is not to cloak action in historical parallel or justification, but to act outside history. Had Shinseki's medium brigades raced into Baghdad under his leadership, realizing destiny, then all glory to him. Instead, the 3d Infantry Division's tanks led the way in a fight similar to the last one, defying the wisdom of the men in this documentary. Another telling comment was that "we think we see better, but I'm not so sure. . . ." Indeed.

31. Clausewitz, *On War*, 78.

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# MR Review Essay

## Anwar Muhammad: Comments on Nasser and the Six-Day War

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In *Harb beela Banadeeq: Akhtar Mooajahah bain Al-Arab wa Isra-eel* (War without guns: the most dangerous confrontation between the Arabs and Israel), Anwar Muhammad, an Egyptian political commentator and historian specializing in the history of the confrontation between Arab states and Israel, uses presidential archives, press releases, and interviews of Egyptian presidents to research Israel's existence, Palestine's self-determination, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>1</sup>

I have translated portions of Muhammad's work that focus on former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and that have military significance. To gain an appreciation of Arab nationalism, the reader should understand that Islamic militants are trying to revive the language of pan-Arabism with the slogans of pan-Islamic unity.

Such language demonstrates that Nasser's strategic thinking and legacy have not entirely disappeared from the Middle East; therefore, we should study Middle Eastern writings to gain insight into how to combat pan-Arabist terror groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade of the Palestinian Al-Fatah movement.

Egypt has played a pivotal role in shaping Arab attitudes toward Israel. Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Israel's Knesset (parliament) in 1977 paved the way for many Arab leaders to deal with Israel through negotiation and mutual understanding.

### Nasser's First Encounter with Israel

Nasser's first real encounter with Israeli forces occurred when he was with the 6th Mechanized Infantry

Brigade during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Haganah forces in the Falujah Pocket surrounded his unit on 31 October 1948, and an Israeli armored vehicle, waving a flag of truce, approached the surrounded Egyptians.

Nasser and Egyptian commanding officer General Said Taha negotiated with the Israelis a face-saving withdrawal for the Egyptian 6th Infantry Brigade back to the main force in Gaza. The Israelis wanted to exchange their dead to ensure proper burial. Israeli Colonel Yigal Alon had ordered the lines of communication to continue, which eventually led to a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces over the course of several months.

Nasser developed a professional relationship with Yaroham Cohen, an Israeli liaison to Egypt. During their visits, Nasser asked Cohen many questions and was keenly interested in the history, tactics, and psychological warfare underground that Jewish groups were using to frustrate British forces. British domination over their respective countries gave them a common enemy.

Communication between the two broke down in late December 1948, however, when Egypt unsuccessfully tried to break the siege of the Falujah pocket. In January 1949, the Israelis exchanged their dead and delivered Red Cross packages and letters to prisoners on both sides, and as a result of political negotiations, Nasser and his 5,000 troops were able to return to Egypt in late February 1949.

Nasser's discussions with Cohen taught him how to organize discontented elements of Egyptian society, including Muslim fundamentalists, and how to create cells in the Egyptian officer corps to foment a coup

against Egyptian monarch King Farouk I. Nasser's last encounter with Cohen was in 1950, when Nasser was sent to identify burial sites of the Israeli dead.

How much Cohen influenced Nasser is not clear. What is clear is that Nasser had detested the Egyptian monarchy before the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. In *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*, Nasser describes historical events beginning with the 1882 Urabi Revolt and ending with the events that occurred in 1942 when Cairo's British Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, surrounded the Abdine Palace with tanks to force a government on King Farouk.<sup>2</sup>

Egyptian archives reveal that Nasser encountered Cohen at a time when Nasser blamed the Egyptian army's humiliation directly on the monarchy and only indirectly on the Israelis. This information is important because these events helped shape Nasser's course of action when he overthrew the Egyptian Government in July 1952.

### Egyptian Strategic Attitudes (1952-1954)

During the first 2 years of the Egyptian Republic, Nasser concerned himself with reorganizing the armed forces, stabilizing Egypt's economy, and handling internal political issues. The Israeli and Palestinian cause was far from Nasser's mind during those early years. He even discussed with his aides the possibility of negotiating something beyond the 1949 Rhodes Armistice with Israel.

Nasser felt a peace agreement, based on UN General Council Resolution 181 (1947 Partition Plan), which guaranteed the Palestinian right of return and the protection of



Arab civil rights in a Jewish state, could be a basis for rapprochement between Egypt and Israel. Nasser's motive for securing a peaceful settlement with Israel was mainly to help him focus on Egypt's many internal problems; achieve the abolition of the regency of King Farouk's infant son, Ahmed Fuad II, in 1953; and further his plans for the peaceful coup of General Mohammed Neguib, the senior face of Egypt's Revolutionary Command Council.

Israeli President David Ben-Gurion hoped to use the momentum of the 1952 Egyptian Revolution to negotiate peace between the two nations. Ben-Gurion used former Yugoslavian dictator Joseph Tito as a communication link between Nasser, Neguib, and himself. Ben-Gurion's hope for peace is best described in a letter he sent to Tito after King Farouk was toppled. In front of the Knesset, Ben-Gurion expressed his hope that events would repair relations between the two nations.

Ben-Gurion viewed Nasser as a social progressive and felt that hostilities between Israel and Egypt were the cause of economic stagnation. However, Palestinian Fedayeen incursions into Israel from Gaza and Israel's retaliation snuffed out the spark of this optimism. On 28 February 1954, an Israeli commando raid, which killed 40 Egyptian soldiers, led Nasser to solicit offensive weapons from the Soviets. The Lavon Affair (a botched Israeli secret service operation that targeted Egyptian military and civilian targets) led to Defense Minister Pinchas Lavon's resignation.

### Israeli Changes (1955-1958)

Nasser's rhetoric and intentions toward Israel became increasingly hostile. But the 1954-1955 attacks that occurred on the Gaza Strip turned relations between Egypt and Israel into a confrontation, and an arms race ensued. Nasser described his frustration over the Lavon Affair and cited the failed attacks on the U.S. Information Services libraries in Cairo and Alexandria as an Israeli plot to drive a wedge between Cairo and Washington.

Nasser received pressure from

members of his armed forces to acquire weapons to counter Israeli threats. He requested arms from the United States, France, and Britain; when his requests were denied, he turned to the Soviet Union, thus beginning the infamous 1955 Czech Arms Deal that gave Cairo unprecedented access to Soviet military hardware.

The year 1955 was pivotal because the Soviet Union was encroaching on the Arab region by furnishing military equipment to Nasser and, according to Muhammad, because U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower dispatched Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson on a round of shuttle diplomacy jaunts between Cairo and Tel Aviv. The Egyptians believed that building the Aswan High Dam was directly related to the success of Anderson's peace mission. However, Nasser's insistence on using UN Resolution 181 as a basis for negotiation and his refusal to meet Ben-Gurion in a neutral country led to the collapse of talks, and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the withdrawal of financial support for the dam.

Nasser, who believed the withdrawal of support was a direct result of Anderson's failed peace mission and his refusal to join the Baghdad Pact made up of Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan, responded by demonizing Israel in his speeches. He solicited help from Moscow to build the Aswan High Dam in an effort to undermine Arab monarchies that were friendly to Western powers and, finally, he nationalized the Suez Canal.

French, Israeli, and British deliberations over Nasser led to the 1956 Suez Crisis. Muhammad outlines three options that reflected Egypt's view of the world powers' response to Nasser:

- France proposed armed intervention with Egypt in case a new French government might decide not to respond to Nasser.
- Britain proposed delaying military action for 2 months to allow diplomatic efforts to resolve Nasser's actions (particularly his seizure of the Suez Canal).
- The United States proposed

destabilizing Nasser through clandestine operations similar to those used in 1953 against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq.

Throughout 1955, Nasser was concerned with French sales to Israel that included 12 Super Mystere jet fighters. Nasser's support for Algerian independence represented a destabilizing force for France. His seizure of the Suez Canal threatened international trade for Britain. Blocking the Suez Canal and blockading the Strait of Tiran to deny Israel shipments of Iranian oil were threats to Israel's security. Egyptian historical records show that after Eisenhower received word of Israel's military preparations on 28 October 1956, he sent a stern warning to Ben-Gurion not to attack first. The Suez Crisis began the next day.

Israel's plan was to invade the Sinai up the eastern side of the Suez Canal. Under the pretext of interest in international maritime trade, France and England would land paratroops and seize the canal. However, the three nations did not take superpower politics into consideration, and in January 1957, Eisenhower demanded withdrawal of all forces from Egypt. The withdrawal inadvertently gave Nasser a political victory, but it also colored his strategic thinking for the next Arab-Israeli conflict—the 1967 Six-Day War.

Secret and indirect communications continued between Egypt and Israel despite the crisis and Nasser's hot rhetoric. The channels were open between the Egyptian Ambassador to Rome, Tharwat Okasha, and his Israeli counterpart, Eliahu Sasson. Nachum Goldman of the World Jewish Congress also kept lines of communication open between Israel and Egypt through Okasha. Their efforts reiterated Nasser's willingness to open a dialogue if Israel would accept the 1947 UN Resolution that had separated Palestine into two states.

The February 1958 union between Egypt and Syria created the United Arab Republics. Nasser also became embroiled in a guerrilla war in Yemen, backing republican officers against the royalist imamate

supported by Saudi Arabia. The 1962 war, which involved over 70,000 Egyptian troops until its conclusion in 1967, is considered Egypt's "Vietnam."

### **Six-Day War Countdown (1966-1967)**

According to Anwar Muhammad, Egyptian military leaders entered the 1967 war with the wrong assumptions and strategic outlook. Nasser assumed that the superpowers would intervene if Israel made the first offensive strike. All Cairo had to do was turn up the pressure on Tel-Aviv, which would have allowed the Arabs to see that Nasser was doing something about the Israelis. At the same time, Nasser knew that as long as he did not cross a threshold and directly attack Israel, the superpowers would not intervene.

Nasser ordered the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from the Sinai and Gaza Strip on 17 May 1967 in response to a 12 November 1966 altercation between Israeli and Jordanian forces during which a Jordanian fighter was downed, killing 14 Jordanian soldiers. On 22 May, Nasser declared a second blockade of the Strait of Tiran, followed by a call for Israel's destruction. Radio Jordan attacked Nasser for his unwillingness to stand by King Hussein and accused the Egyptian Armed Forces of hiding behind UN peacekeepers. For this reason, Nasser chose to close the Strait of Tiran again.

During the time leading up to the war several telling events occurred, including a duel between Syrian and Israeli jets on 7 April 1967 that led to the downing of six Syrian MiGs. Damascus requested immediate military assistance from Nasser, asking him to send air defense units or open a front along the Egyptian-Israeli border. Nasser signed an order on 1 May allowing Egyptian air assets to defend Syria against Israeli attacks.

During Sadat's visit to Moscow on 13 May, he learned that Israeli troops were concentrating along the Syrian border. In response, two Egyptian divisions were sent into the Sinai.<sup>3</sup>

Jordan reported Israeli troop

movement along its border and Jordanian Army Chief of Staff General Amer Hammash gave concrete reports to Nasser that 500 Israeli armored vehicles and tanks were heading toward the West Bank. Military convoys, extending 5 miles, were heading south toward the Egyptian border. Jordanian intelligence notified Nasser that seven Israeli divisions were concentrated along the Egyptian front.

Nasser confided to Hussein that he hoped to engage in a full-scale war with Israel in 3 to 4 years, but events had expedited his plans and he could not leave Syria and Jordan to their fate. The two leaders talked about strategic depth as it related to jet fighter-bombers being based in Jordan, Syria, and Egypt.

Hussein and Nasser ended their meeting by signing a mutual defense pact: "Today the Egyptian Army stands with the Jordanian Army, Syrian Army, and Lebanese Army on the border of Israel to accept these [new] challenges and behind us is the Iraqi Army, Algerian Army, Kuwaiti Army, Sudanese Army, and the entire Arab ummah (community)."<sup>4</sup>

### **Nasser-Johnson Exchange**

Nasser's speeches were becoming more hostile as he continued to rail that the real issue was not the Strait of Tiran but the rights of the Palestinians. Nasser's speeches did not go unnoticed by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Army Chief of Staff General Yitzak Rabin. A letter from U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, dated 23 May 1967, asked Nasser to try to solve his differences without using force.

The Egyptian version of this story says Johnson was weighing his options and was concerned whether Israel could sustain a first strike against the combined Arab armies. What is not mentioned is Nasser's antagonism toward the British in Aden or his choice to exercise aerial bombardment on southern Saudi towns, which led to the United States continuing its presence in Dhahran Airbase from 1962 to 1967.

Nasser's response to Johnson's letter shows that Nasser was play-

ing a high-stakes game of strategic bluff through escalation short of war. Nasser was counting on the United States and the Soviet Union to restrain Israel from making the first strike. Nasser told Johnson that his efforts were defensive in nature and designed to protect the United Arab Republics and their allies from Israeli incursions, and he intended to lift the blockade on the Strait of Tiran once the crisis with Israel subsided. He further wrote that the rights of the Palestinian people were of the utmost importance and that everyone should recognize this. Nasser said Israel had repeatedly broken the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian Armistice, which made it moot. He closed his letter by asking Johnson to help save the Middle East from military escalation and conflict. Nasser's letter showed the historical realities he was laboring under.

### **Nasser Talks to His Chiefs**

On 2 June 1967 (the same day Nasser sent the letter to Johnson), he told his Armed Forces chiefs that the probability for war with Israel was 100 percent. Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Abdul-Hakeem Amer sat next to Nasser, who was surrounded by his top military commanders. The discussion quickly turned to the issue of a first-strike option against Israel. Air Marshal Sidqui Mahmoud asked Nasser for permission to authorize a first strike. Nasser replied that Egypt did not possess the planes or plans to undertake a decisive first strike, explaining that an Egyptian first strike would give the United States a pretext to enter the war on Israel's side.

Mahmoud responded that if Israel conducted the first strike it would be catastrophic for Egypt, reasoning that the airbases in Sinai were within striking range of Israeli fighters. Nasser's discussion with Mahmoud focused on Egyptian strikes on airbases in the Sinai and the ability to absorb air losses. They felt their fighter assets in the Delta and Aswan could retaliate against an Israeli first strike. Neither Nasser nor Mahmoud had any idea Israel was planning a deep aerial strike beyond the Sinai and into Egypt.



## The 1967 Six-Day War

At 0745, 5 June 1967, 174 Israeli planes attacked Egyptian airbases in two waves. Anwar Muhammad asks: How was Israel capable of executing and establishing complete aerial surprise over Egypt and the combined Arab forces of Jordan and Syria? Many explanations of the 1967 debacle tend to deflect blame, although most Egyptians put the blame on Amer. Anwar Muhammad offers other explanations.

In 1956, Israel acquired from Britain a Suez Crisis air plan for the invasion of Egypt. Egypt claims British MI-6 delivered the plan, codenamed Turkey Hunt, to Israel to destabilize Nasser. The Egyptians felt Israeli Air Chief Ezra Weizman and his successor, General Mordechai Hod, used the plan to train fighter pilots. Israel had carefully monitored Egypt's squadron patterns and learned the pilots' routines. The Israeli air plan involved striking 11 Egyptian air bases simultaneously in two waves. The Ajloun observation and signals reconnaissance post in Jordan reported an Israeli jet fighter concentration heading south toward the Sinai. Egyptian General Abdul-Moneim Riad frantically sent three coded flash messages. The cipher code, however, changed every 3 days and, because the Jordanian sector of the Unified Arab Command did not have the new codes, the warning was never received. Israel had achieved tactical surprise.

## After the Six-Day War

Weeks after hostilities ended between Egypt and Israel, Nasser addressed senior military members on Egypt's strategy as it related to the new realities stemming from the outcome of the Six-Day War. He outlined the following points:

- The refusal of the Egyptian people to surrender or to consider the 5 June 1967 war as the final battle between Arabs and Israelis.
- Egypt's duty to liberate occupied lands in accordance with UN Security Resolutions.
- The refusal to subject themselves to Israeli demands, particularly in any negotiations for a settled peace in the region.
- Failures on the (diplomatic) political front that made it necessary to again rebuild Egypt's Armed Forces.

- Because the battle was only one (winning) battle, the Israeli attack was against Arab national unity, making it necessary to coordinate the goals of all Arab armies and unify 100-million Arabs politically, militarily, and emotionally.

- The Palestinian cause was the entire Arab communities' cause; therefore, it was up to everyone to stand against Israeli expansionism.

Despite his defiant speech, Nasser had reached the high-water mark of his career. The Six-Day War would lead to a transformation of Egyptian national security. Shortly after the cease-fire, Nasser would begin what would be called the War of Attrition, which would include artillery exchanges along the Suez Canal and special forces strikes in the Sinai that lasted from March 1969 to August 1970. On a strategic level, Nasser needed these small skirmishes to show the Egyptian people and the Arab masses that he was acting against the Israelis. On a tactical level these wars would begin the process of formulating war plans for the 1973 Yom-Kippur War.

Nasser's final military act was to implement what would eventually become a dense anti-air system of SAM missiles. He understood the need to shore up Egypt's air defenses before again undertaking offensive measures against Israeli forces in the Sinai.

Nasser also wanted a 90-day cease-fire, which eventually became the Rogers Plan (brokered by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers). Militarily, Nasser needed time to develop a redundant missile-defense system, which is one reason for his willingness to accept a cessation of hostilities. The cease-fire lasted from August to November 1970, but Nasser did not live to see it end. He died of a heart attack on 28 September 1970.

## Anwar Sadat

Anwar Muhammad's book continues with a brief chapter on Anwar Sadat, but Muhammad does not delve as deeply into Sadat's strategic thinking before and after the 1973 Yom-Kippur War as he does when discussing Nasser. The rest of the book details the peace negotiations and the implementation of the peace agreements between Egypt's current leader Hosni Mubarak and successive Israeli governments. Muhammad also discusses Egypt's role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives.

Although the book is not as definitive as Mohammad Hasanein Heikal's volumes on the 1967 and 1973 wars, it is still a valuable contribution to understanding the strategic perspectives of three Egyptian presidents and how they dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>5</sup> **MR**

## NOTES

1. Anwar Muhammad, *Harb beela Banadeeq: Akhtar Moojahjah bain Al-Arab wa Isra-eel* (War without guns: the most dangerous confrontation between the Arabs and Israel) (Cairo: Akhbar-al-Yom Press, 1997).
2. Gamal Abdul-Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington, DC: PublicAffairs Press, 1955).
3. Egypt maintains this was an elaborate Soviet ruse to further pressure Egypt into engaging Israel to maintain stability in Syria.
4. Muhammad. Page number not given.
5. Mohammad Hasanein Heikal. No publishing data available.

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# Coercive Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy

Chaplain (Colonel) Douglas McCready, U.S. Army, Ph.D.

Coercive diplomacy is the use of military power short of war to effect a change in a target country's policies or political makeup. This includes positive inducements as well as negative sanctions (a carrot as well as a stick, although the carrot should be dangled only after the stick has been vigorously brandished). As the studies in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2003), demonstrate, coercive diplomacy is a difficult endeavor with a low success rate. Often, it is the last step before resorting to force.

The book's table of contents reads like today's newspaper. Case studies examine U.S. attempts to employ coercive diplomacy between 1990 and 2001 in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, North Korea, China-Taiwan, and Iraq. The authors of the studies are experts in their subject, and several were involved in the cases they examined. Two theoretical essays about the nature and utility of coercive diplomacy bracket the seven case studies. Alexander George, who developed the concept of coercive diplomacy, contributes a foreword. His expertise on the subject is so significant that all the essays defer to his pioneering work.

## An Alternative to War

In the introduction, Art and Cronin explain: "The need to back U.S. diplomacy with force will not go away; consequently, political-military coercion short of all-out war will remain a highly attractive option to U.S. leaders. Therefore, these leaders need to understand what coercive diplomacy can and cannot accomplish."

Although coercive diplomacy is an alternative to war, it is a risky way to use military force. Failed coercive diplomacy leaves a state with only two options: back down or go to war. The worst situation to be in is attempting coercive diplomacy when the other side has a much higher stake in the outcome than you do.

Coercive diplomacy is particu-

larly difficult in humanitarian interventions. Art and Cronin list eight elements in coercive diplomacy, two of which are essential to success: the opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation and the coercer's stronger will to prevail. The paradox is that it is often difficult to communicate the coercer's resolve without actually going to war. The editors also warn that military superiority is no guarantee of success, as was demonstrated in Somalia in 1993.

To evaluate the success of U.S. coercive diplomacy, the editors reorganized the 7 case studies into 16 cases. They find five successes, eight failures, two mixed results, and one case wherein the relation between coercion and result is ambiguous. Two of the failures led to war (Iraq [1990-1991] and Afghanistan [2001]). In two cases (North Korea [1994] and China [1996]), the coercion was mutual, and neither situation is more stable now than before.

## Mixed Results in the Taiwan Strait

Possibly the most interesting of the cases was the crisis in the Taiwan Strait during the run-up to Taiwan's first free presidential election in March 1996. China considers Taiwan a renegade province that must be reunited with the mainland. Hints of Taiwanese independence elicit a strong response because they might call into question the legitimacy of the Communist government on the mainland. A visit to the United States in 1995 by Taiwan's president provoked China. That summer, China conducted ballistic missile tests and naval exercises near Taiwan. In November, it conducted amphibious landing exercises on a Chinese island in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's subsequent legislative elections resulted in a reduced margin for the president's party.

Just before Taiwan's March 1996 presidential election, China tested ballistic missiles near the shipping lanes of the island's two major ports. China also announced plans to conduct live-fire naval and air exercises near Taiwan up to the day

of the election. The United States responded by deploying two carrier battle groups near Taiwan. Taiwan's independence-minded president won a resounding victory.

Taiwan is a complicated example of coercive diplomacy, and it remains unclear who won. China sought to coerce both Taiwan and the United States; the former regarding its tendencies toward independence, the latter regarding its political and military support for the island. The United States attempted to coerce China to not use force against Taiwan. Taiwan's president tempered his rhetoric, but won the election. U.S. President Bill Clinton soon made a statement strongly supporting China's claims regarding Taiwan. The United States caused China to back off, but China's leaders vowed never again to allow the United States to intimidate it and began acquiring weapons intended to make future U.S. intervention in the area more dangerous.

The other case studies demonstrate equally well how complex and difficult it is to successfully implement coercive diplomacy, but they also remind us that when it is successful, it saves us from going to war. Art and Cronin conclude with a chapter on lessons learned and policy suggestions for those in positions to implement coercive diplomacy. He offers military readers a helpful look at nonmilitary aspects of the use of force and explains to the military's civilian leaders the advantages and risks of using a political-military alternative to war. **MR**

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### General William E. DePuy

A decorated veteran of World War II and Vietnam, a prolific writer on military affairs, and the first commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, General William E. DePuy spearheaded the effort to professionalize the Army in the wake of Vietnam. Under his guidance, for the first time in its 200-year history the Army acquired a doctrine. DePuy laid the foundation for AirLand Battle and the training revolution of the 1980s and set in motion concepts and systems that would play out with stunning success during Operation Desert Storm. He was, by all accounts, a thinking man's infantryman, one who believed that thought and debate were as much a part of soldiering as marching and shooting.



# MR Book Reviews

**MULLAHS, MERCHANTS, AND MILITANTS: The Economic Collapse of the Arab World**, Stephen J. Glain, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2004, 350 pages, \$25.95.

In *Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants*, Stephen J. Glain forwards the premise that the Global War on Terrorism is alarmist reactionism as flawed in theory and concept as President Dwight D. Eisenhower's policy of containment of the spread of communism during the Cold War. According to Glain, the Eisenhower Doctrine and President George W. Bush's policy of unilateralism are miscues that cost the United States vital prestige and influence in an Arab world fraught with instability.

Glain further contends that America has "vastly misjudged" the status and credibility of fundamentalist Islam in the Muslim consciousness, just as Osama bin-Laden overestimated his ability to incite an Islamic fatwah against the Western world in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Glain sees what began as a judicious assault against "provocative militants in their lairs" as having devolved into a crusade in the Muslim heartland that threatens the "reservoir of goodwill" most Arabs have for the United States and its values.

According to Glain, the solution for stability is wholly based in economic trade. Commerce alone, the natural enemy of the most violent of fundamentalist passions, will temper revolution and bring peace to a region where commerce and culture once thrived. Highlighting the fact that the Middle East represents the lowest level of global trade relative to economic output, Glain focuses responsibility on a "mix of political oppression, stagnant economies, and [high] population growth" that threatens to erode the region into a hopeless, despair-ridden breeding ground for fundamentalism. Glain

believes the answer lies in policies that promote the secular desires of the Middle Eastern consciousness, which provide opportunities for representative government and economic prosperity.

Glain was the Middle Eastern correspondent for *The Wall Street Journal* from 1998 to 2001 and is now covering global economic matters for *The Boston Globe*. From his base in Amman, Jordan, he traveled to Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Egypt to provide firsthand accounts of those countries' economic challenges and prospects.

*Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants* is an insightful view of the Middle East's instability—one that offers unparalleled historical perspective with uniquely modern analysis. Glain, a provocative author who writes crisp, clean prose, is a rarity, considering the subject matter. More conservative readers might take exception to his theme and his assertions, but his analysis and conclusions are absolutely unbiased and worth serious consideration. The book is brilliant and should be necessary reading for senior military officers and political aspirants.

**MAJ Steve Leonard, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**PROVINCIAL POWER AND ABSOLUTE MONARCHY: The Estates General of Burgundy: 1661-1790**, Julian Swann, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, 460 pages, \$90.00.

*Provincial Power and Absolute Monarchy: The Estates General of Burgundy: 1661-1790* is a worthwhile contribution to the pool of literature that attempts to make sense of the nature of so-called absolutism in France in the early modern period. The book, which deals specifically with politics in Burgundy, seeks to offer insight from the Burgundian

perspective into the long-debated question: How "absolute" was absolute monarchy? Was it a transition stage from early modern to modern forms of government, or was it the highest level to which a renaissance monarchy could aspire?

Through analysis of the Estates General of Burgundy, which was the highest organ of Burgundian government and modeled on the Estates General of France, Julian Swann creates context for the implementation of absolutism. The book begins with a chronicle of Louis XIV's long reign of personal rule and ends with the French Revolution. It seems strange that the book does not begin its chronological coverage earlier, since Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu are often considered to be the effective originators of absolutism.

Regardless, the book is useful for those interested in European history, particularly the early modern period, early modern politics, and the history of France. Those seeking more about military science will find Swann's work less useful. Even if the book is viewed as a work of politics, the differences between an early modern government and a contemporary government are significant enough to render it less relevant to the modern world. The book is best considered a work of history.

**David J. Schepp,  
Fort Benning, Georgia**

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**ALL RIGHT LET THEM COME: The Civil War Diary of an East Tennessee Confederate**, John Guilford Earnest, Charles Swift Northen III, ed., University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 2003, 115 pages, \$24.95.

John Guilford Earnest, the son of a small slaveowner in eastern Tennessee, was a college student in

Virginia when the Civil War began. Eastern Tennessee opposed secession, and Earnest did not enlist in the early rush to the colors in 1861.

When the Confederate Congress passed a universal conscription act in 1862, Earnest enlisted in the 60th Tennessee Infantry, which was part of John C. Vaughn's Tennessee Brigade. Initially serving as the regimental commissary, he was promoted to lieutenant in the fall of 1862. Earnest served with Vaughn's brigade at Chickasaw Bluff, Vicksburg, and stayed with the brigade until April 1865.

Editor Charles Swift Northen III fleshes out the details of life in the 60th Tennessee from the regiment's formation in northeastern Tennessee to its surrender in Vicksburg. The diary's entries from 18 May 1863 to 4 July 1863 are consolidated into one paragraph. Included are the events between September 1862 and May 1863 as seen by a sergeant and company grade officer of a mediocre brigade.

The book includes short biographies of Earnest and Vaughn that are of some general interest, but overall, this book will only interest aficionados of the Vicksburg Campaign.

**LTC D. Jonathan White, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**STORM OF STEEL: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union,** Mary R. Habeck, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2003, 309 pages, \$36.50.

For officers who find the current period of transformation perplexing, the period between the world wars offers a potentially rich source of context and inspiration. Between 1914 and 1918, World War I battlefields suggested potential use for the tank, the airplane, the submarine, and the radio. What remained to be seen was who could best exploit that potential—who would “get it right,” to use Sir Michael Howard's famous phrase.

Author Mary R. Habeck argues that when it came to the tank's battlefield possibilities, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany got it right. By 1936, both had developed effective

doctrine for using armored forces in battles of maneuver. *Storm of Steel* compares the way these doctrines emerged in the Soviet and German armies. The book is a work of exemplary scholarship as Habeck uses her impressive linguistic and analytical skills to exploit German and Soviet archives. She demonstrates how the Reichswehr and the Soviet Army overcame serious obstacles to develop an effective conceptual basis for the use of mechanized forces.

Panzer buffs should beware. This book is not about weapons and technology; it is about ideas. Habeck shows how armored doctrine evolved as competing factions bounced concepts and arguments off each other. Early Soviet tank advocates had to overcome the Bolshevik celebration of the mass proletarian army. German Army mechanized warfare proponents had to outlast the horse cavalry's last true believers. Intellectual resistance, however, was far from the only obstacle to change. The Germans had to emphasize conceptual development because the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty limited technological innovation. In the same fashion, early Soviet innovation was handicapped by an inadequate industrial base.

The Soviet and German cases did not evolve in isolation. One of the real strengths of Habeck's book is her exploration of the cooperation between the Soviets and Germans in the interwar years. This is a topic that has been given only limited treatment elsewhere. Habeck shows that these strange bedfellows benefited from the class and field trials conducted at the secret site at Kazan. She also shows a tense collaboration marked by the intense suspicion the Soviets held for the Germans and the contempt the Reichswehr officers held for Russian professional competence.

Of course, Soviet and German paths diverged after 1936. With Hitler's support and the benefit of a professional culture receptive to innovation, the Wehrmacht incorporated panzer divisions into a rapidly maturing concept of maneuver warfare—blitzkrieg. The Soviets, on the other hand, found it difficult to validate the demanding needs of

their visionary deep battle doctrine on the training field. Before they could overcome the obstacles of doctrinal confusion and technological backwardness, Stalin ended the deep battle experiment. His lethal paranoia rewarded key intellectual leaders—men like Mikhail Tukachevsky and A.A. Svechin—with a bullet to the back of the neck. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, they found Soviet armored forces in doctrinal and organizational disarray.

The book's one unfortunate aspect is its title: *Storm of Steel* is similar to Ernst Juenger's famous autobiographical description of trench warfare during World War I, *The Storm of Steel* (Howard Fertig, New York, 1996). Because of this, Habeck's book might be overlooked, which would be unfortunate. Habeck has written a thoughtful, relevant book that deserves a wide reading.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,  
Retired, Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas**

**WHERE THEY LAY: Searching for America's Lost Soldiers,** Earl Swift, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, 2003, 307 pages, \$25.00.

On 20 March 1971, Major Jack Barker and his crew were flying in support of Operation Lam Son 719, the South Vietnamese attack on North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Laos. While attempting to extract South Vietnamese soldiers trapped at a firebase about to be overrun by the North Vietnamese Army, Barker's aircraft was struck by intense enemy ground fire that severed the tailboom. Because the crash site was in Laos, the bodies of the American fliers were never recovered.

In 2001, a U.S. recovery team arrived in the Laotian jungle to search for the remains of lost Army aviators. In *Where They Lay*, journalist Earl Swift artfully interweaves a vivid narrative about Barker's fatal mission with a firsthand account of the recovery team's attempt to locate and bring home the crew's remains. The result is a dramatic story of dedication and selfless duty.

The recovery team was headed by a civilian anthropologist from

the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (since combined with Joint Task Force-Full Accounting [JTF-FA] under one command and renamed the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command). The crash site had been identified through exhaustive research of the flyers' mission and a thorough on-the-ground search by a JTF-FA search team.

The recovery team, accompanied by Swift, traveled to the remote area where they set up camp. For more than a month the team braved heat, insects, and unexploded ordnance to locate the missing crew. Aided by Laotian workers, team members painstakingly laid out a grid the size of half a football field and began what looked like an archaeological dig, effectively moving a mountain of dirt one bucket at a time in search of evidence that the helicopter had actually gone down at the site, and more important, looking for the crew's remains.

After explaining the search methodology, Swift introduces the reader to the U.S. helicopter crew, putting faces on the soldiers and describing how each arrived in Vietnam and came together for their fateful mission. Swift provides the same level of detail when describing recovery team members and their motivations and feelings.

While describing the methods the recovery team used, Swift relates the history of the larger effort, ongoing since 1992, to locate, recover, and identify the remains of 90,000 unaccounted-for servicemen lost in America's wars.

Swift clearly admires the downed airmen and the members of the recovery team, but that does not prevent him from asking some extremely difficult questions. The effort to bring home the lost from old wars costs more than \$100 million a year, and the cost is not just in money: Seven Americans died during a recovery effort in Vietnam just months before Swift went into Laos. Asking if the effort is worth the cost, Swift leaves it to his readers to determine for themselves.

*Where They Lay* is an outstanding book on several levels. It is thoroughly researched and well writ-

ten. More than that, it is eloquent testimony not only to those who gave their lives in the line of duty but to those who labor to make sure America leaves no soldier behind. For these reasons, I highly recommend the book, not just to military historians, but to the general readership as well.

**LTC James H. Willbanks, USA,  
Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas**

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**LONE STAR CONFEDERATE: A Gallant and Good Soldier of the Fifth Texas Infantry**, Robert Campbell, Mark W. Perkins, and George Skoch, eds., Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2003, 163 pages, \$27.50.

*Lone Star Confederate*, a delightful book, relates its story with the genuine emotion of its author, Robert Campbell, who had recently fought in the war he describes. The Civil War began in 1861, when Campbell was a student in Louisiana. In 1862, he enlisted in the famous Texas Brigade in Confederate General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, where he served off and on from the spring of 1862 until he was wounded for the fourth and final time in autumn 1864.

*Lone Star Confederate* is the story of the campaigns in which Campbell participated between April and September 1862. During this time, General John Bell Hood's Texas Brigade began carving out its reputation as the hardest fighting brigade in Lee's Army, having participated in the Peninsula Campaign, the Seven Days Battle, and the Battle of 2d Manassas, during which Campbell was wounded in the leg and sent home to convalesce. This is where the narrative ends, although the editors have appended some writings by Campbell from later periods of the war. Of particular note is Campbell's firsthand account of the episode of Lee and the Texas Brigade at the Battle of the Wilderness.

A positive characteristic of the book is that it was written in 1866, when Campbell's memories were

still fresh and before the onset of the great "lost cause" myth. Because Campbell was relatively well educated, his book is well written while retaining the earthy quality of one who saw the war from the ranks of the infantry. The book's main drawback is that Campbell never finished his story. Still, what we do have is an excellent account of a private soldier's recollections, and it is well worth reading.

**LTC D. Jonathan White, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**BALANCING RISKS: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery**, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2004, 304 pages, \$39.95.

America's intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 and its tendency to intervene in other wayward states make Jeffrey W. Taliaferro's book *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery* timely and insightful for the decisionmakers and executors of U.S. national security.

Why do great powers intervene in peripheral areas? To answer that question, Taliaferro constructs a "balance of risk" theory using a political scientist's careful logic, structure, and acumen. Leaders of great powers who perceive a loss of power, status, or prestige are motivated to embark on risky interventions to achieve or maintain their expectation levels. Under this theory, when confronted with evidence their strategy is not working, national leaders still persist in risk acceptance, regardless of the costs or diminishing returns.

Taliaferro selects three excellent cases to illustrate his theory: Germany and the 1905 Morocco Crisis; Japan and its 1940-1941 war decisions; and the United States and the 1950-1951 Korean War. He dissects each case to test his hypotheses and refine his theory. He also includes five examples to show how his theory applies to situations that could yield possible gains, and he gives equal treatment to the two competing theories of foreign policy: offensive realism and the



logrolling theory (both relevant when discussing interventions).

In the last chapter, Taliaferro provides a glimpse of his theory's policy implications. Under his theory, aversion to a perceived loss in prestige weighs heavily when analyzing U.S. President George W. Bush's Administration. Taliaferro outlines consequences that should be evaluated.

The book is well organized, provides solid notes, and has sound primary sources and a consistent structure. A few large-scale maps, however, might have been helpful to orient the reader to crisis points in Morocco, Manchuria, and Korea. While the book is a political scientist's dream, it might be a bit laborious for others. I certainly recommend this book to military officers and academics interested in high-level strategy.

**Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D.,**  
Archamps Campus, France

**THE WISDOM OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT**, Lance Kurke, American Management Association, New York, 2004, 168 pages, \$21.95.

*The Wisdom of Alexander the Great* outlines leadership maxims and draws conclusions from successful battle leaders. Author Lance Kurke compares battle leaders' successes to current trends and situations; provides insights into how to reframe problems; shows how to build alliances; and describes how to recognize and understand others' traditions. Although some of Kurke's conclusions seem to reach afar, many cause the reader to pause to think.

Kurke analyzes how Alexander, with a landlocked army, defeated a navy force and an enemy that had terrain, position, and troop advantage. Alexander's indirect approach to problemsolving is instructive. When he was faced with insurmountable obstacles, he resorted to innovative problemsolving techniques to seek out enemy weaknesses.

Kurke uses parallels to stress points of leadership, and although

some of his points do not relate to current culture and societal shifts, many of his ideas parallel current military doctrine as reflected in the Army's principles of war.

Studying successful leaders in battle and drawing conclusions from their successes and failures is critical to professional growth. Studying Kurke's writings helps provide insight into why some leaders succeed and some fail.

**LTC Billy J. Hadfield, USA,**  
Retired, Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas

**BRITAIN, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 1955-1958: Beyond Suez**, Orna Almog, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR, 2003, 243 pages, \$59.50.

This short, information-packed monograph, which challenges conventional wisdom about the events that occurred in the region between 1955 and 1958, is a boon to serious students of Middle Eastern history.

Orna Almog examines the Anglo-Israeli relationship during these years and includes information about the Cold War and superpower rivalries.

While the Suez Crisis and other events in 1956 were important, they are far overshadowed by events in 1958 (including the Iraqi coup d'état, the collapse of the Baghdad Pact, and the landing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon and U.K. troops in Jordan). The year 1958 marked the entry of the United States into the Middle East, the decline of British influence, and Britain's foreign policy shift away from the Arabs and toward the Israelis.

Almog uses Ben-Gurion University and Israeli state archives in her well-researched book to counterbalance the traditional Western governmental resources of the United Kingdom and the United States. The book is entertaining despite its scholarly tone, and I highly recommend it for

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**LTC John E. Taylor, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**STALIN AND HIS HANGMEN:  
The Tyrant and Those Who  
Killed for Him**, Donald Rayfield,  
Random House, New York, 2004,  
541 pages, \$29.95.

Joseph Stalin's dictatorship survived by instilling terror and societal paranoia throughout the country and systematically arranging one purge after another. Stalin's henchmen carried out mass murder within virtually every ethnicity and institution inside the Soviet Union, including clergy, scholars, poets, doctors, scientists, military officers, writers, actors, political rivals and nonrivals, and even Stalin's own dreaded secret services.

Eventually, even the executioners were executed and a new wave of terror occurred under new organizations. Whether it was by Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) or the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), the mass killings of thousand of innocent people continued for decades.

Unlike Adolf Hitler, Stalin almost exclusively murdered his own countrymen. Between 1937 and 1938, he massacred approximately 750,000 Soviet citizens (many loyal to his own Communist Party), and he imprisoned twice that many in Siberian camps—most never heard from again.

Stalin's defeat in Finland in 1940 and his retreat from Hitler's forces in 1941 came from purging his own army. Incredibly, the slaughter of thousands of his military personnel, including 144 divisional commanders, was seated in Stalin's own paranoia, not any known coup attempt. And, most of the 1,836,000 surviving Red Army prisoners of war liberated from the Axis powers at the end of World War II were sent to the Gulag as "traitors to the motherland."

Stalin's fratricidal actions included the Katyn massacres, in which the NKVD executed 22,000

Polish officers, policemen, and civil servants. Stalin's first lieutenant, Lavrentii Beria, saw to it that the executioners were rewarded with money, medals, and awards before they themselves were executed.

Exceptionally well researched and written, Rayfield's book provides valuable insights into Stalin's reign of terror and its lasting effects on Russia. Rayfield's historical accounts alone make the book worth reading. But, even more important, the book provides a window into the fundamental mechanisms of communism and the methods taken to sustain dictatorships. Lest we forget, governments like this are *not* a thing of the past.

**LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**TALES OF A COLD WAR SUB-  
MARINER**, Dan Summitt, Texas  
A&M University Press, College  
Station, 2004, 257 pages, \$60.00.

Dan Summitt graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1947 and served aboard a destroyer in the China Sea before entering the submarine "silent service," where he served on five submarines, two of which (a nuclear-powered attack submarine and a nuclear-powered Polaris missile submarine) he commanded.

As captain of the USS *Seadragon*, Summitt led his crew to a secret rendezvous under the Arctic ice with another nuclear attack submarine before heading to the North Pole. While captain of the USS *Alexander Hamilton*, Summitt and his crew encountered the near loss of their submarine because of a faulty needle piston.

As Summitt prepared for each of his assignments, he found new challenges combined with opportunities to learn and grow. I appreciated his pursuit of self-awareness, adaptability, and life-long learning to cope with technological change. He handled each problem on its own merit and found innovative solutions, saying, "[F]rom my earliest days in submarines I was impressed by the fact that I seemed to learn something new every day"—a point

we could all do well to remember. I heartily recommend his book.

**LTC Christopher E. Bailey,  
USAR, Charlottesville, Virginia**

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**THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE  
SLOVIK**, William Bradford Huie,  
Westholme, Yardley, PA, 2004, 249  
pages, \$14.95.

After nearly a decade, the Judge Advocate General's office agreed to release records of U.S. Army Private Eddie Slovik's execution. With the Department of Defense's full cooperation, William Bradford Huie tells the story of the only soldier executed for desertion during World War II. In fact, Slovik has been the only soldier executed for desertion since the Civil War. Huie questions why Slovik, a 24-year-old draftee from Detroit, met such a fate.

During World War II, approximately 40,000 soldiers deserted. Of these, 2,864 were tried by general courts-martial, and 49 death sentences were handed down. Slovik was the only one to be executed. What did he do that was so bad? The question remains unanswered at the end of the book, but not because Huie did not try. His extensive research draws on personal interviews, official Army documents, and Slovik's correspondence with his wife. Slovik's opinion was that he was being singled out because he was an ex-convict and his execution would make a good example. But was Slovik a hardened criminal? According to him, he was convicted "for bread and chewing gum I stole when I was twelve years old."

In 1943, the United States reconsidered its draft policy and allowed men who had criminal records to be drafted. Slovik reported for duty, but often wrote his wife that he would not fight. After arriving in Europe, he and his escort fell under heavy shelling. Unable the next morning to find his escort, he tagged along with the Canadian 13th Provost Corps and became their cook. After 6 weeks of attempts to reach the 109th Infantry via letter and radiogram, he was

finally turned over to U.S. Military Police.

Once he reached the 109th Infantry Regiment of the 28th Division, Slovik told the captain of Company G that he could not go to the front lines and would run away if not given a rear assignment. Slovik was assigned to the 4th Platoon and told he would be tried for desertion if he left. He left, and the next day he made his way to a neighboring unit and handed a cook a confession stating he had deserted and that he would run away again.

Slovik was given an opportunity to destroy his confession, but refused. After a trial, a psychiatric exam, and reviews all the way up the line to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Slovik was found guilty of desertion and sentenced to death by firing squad.

Readers will come to their own conclusions about the government's choice to execute Slovik, but in light of recent events it is important to examine the details of a desertion. What is the military's obligation when soldiers disobey orders? Slovik failed to obey orders and paid the ultimate price. Others did not. The book is a good starting point for continued debate.

**1LT Stephen R. Spulick, USA,  
Schwetzingen, Germany**

**EUROPE IN A WIDER WORLD: 1350-1650**, Robin W. Winks and Lee Palmer Wandel, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, 256 pages, \$29.00.

*Europe in a Wider World: 1350-1650* is a history of the early modern European period. By emphasizing that there are no set formulas, theories, or patterns that allow one to insert the facts and chug out predictable outcomes, authors Robin W. Winks and Lee Palmer Wandel separate their study from others in the social sciences field.

Winks and Wandel use the Crusades and Eastern European history as background for the central events of the time, coming back to the "normal" starting points of the Black Death and the Hundred Years' War. Unlike most books

that close this period with key political and military events such as the Thirty Years' War, the Peace of Westphalia, and the English Civil War, Winks and Wandel use atypical events to complete their book. They end on a much more progressive note, addressing the philosophical and scientific advances of the age.

While the book is generally well balanced, the authors notably downplay religion and reduce some developments, such as the Babylonian captivity and Papal noninvolvement in the Peace of Westphalia, to non-events. Similarly, they only lightly brush on the importance of Middle Eastern influence in the safeguarding and preservation of Western philosophy.

With its many small, positive nuances, Winks and Wandel's book is a challenging study for students of early modern Europe. The authors' focus on thought process is the approach today's students need to take and the one noticeably absent in many other works.

**LTC Michael A. Boden, USA,  
Hohenfels, Germany**

**DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: The Impact of U.S. Policy**, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2004, 415 pages, \$25.00.

*Drugs and Democracy in Latin America* contains individual essays on U.S. drug policy and its effect on drug-producing and Latin American countries through which drug runners transit. The point of the essays seems to be that U.S. drug policy has a negative effect on Latin American countries and that military involvement is largely inappropriate for the war on drugs.

Well researched, the book brims with information, and each essay provides concrete facts and figures to support the writer's arguments. However, some writers intermix politics to reach unsupported conclusions about military involvement. Statistical facts support the premise that the U.S. drug policy is costly and ineffective, but the

authors' tangents, such as discussing the military's involvement (whether from a Latin American nation or from the United States), distract the reader from any serious consideration of otherwise valid arguments. Still, the book accurately exposes numerous problems with the current U.S. drug policy.

In my opinion, the book's conclusions and recommendations are largely correct and well focused, but the authors commit a major error in assuming that police action alone will suffice. This simplistic assumption ignores a police force's inability to confront heavily armed groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Such assumptions also ignore the long history of most Latin American nations where the military, whether right or wrong, forms an integral part of the national history and structure.

The final chapter—and best part of the book—apolitically outlines major U.S. drug-policy problems by area and presents surprisingly good recommendations to improve each. Overall, the book is best suited for serious students of U.S. foreign policy who can distinguish relevant facts and valid recommendations from political rhetoric. I do not recommend the book to novices lest they believe some of the misconstrued comments about military involvement.

**MAJ Robert A. Davidson, USA,  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina**

**MARCH OF DEATH: Sir John Moore's Retreat to Corunna, 1808-1809**, Christopher Summer-ville, 2003, Greenhill Books, London, 240 pages, \$34.95.

The British love their epic retreats, and Christopher Summer-ville's *March of Death: Sir John Moore's Retreat to Corunna, 1808-1809* fills that need. Summerville's story is about a small expeditionary force deployed to the continent with scant intelligence and few instructions. Commanded by Sir John Moore, the force suddenly finds itself the sole objective of the French Army and has to retreat



250 miles in the winter to Corunna, Spain, to be evacuated by the Royal Navy. While this might seem like a description of Dunkirk in 1940, it is actually a scene 130 years earlier, when Great Britain was cooperating with Spain to resist Napoleon's invasion.

Summerville gives three reasons for writing his book. The first reason is to introduce modern readers to Moore, a highly regarded lieutenant general who had the potential to be one of Great Britain's great military commanders. (Moore was killed during the climatic battle of the campaign and has been overshadowed by such leaders as the Duke of Wellington.) Summerville's second goal is to present a chronological history of the campaign. His third goal is to familiarize readers with the hardships and horrors of a winter campaign and retreat.

Although Moore's name is in the title, he is a remote actor in much of the book. Summerville focuses instead on the rearguard and the hardships the army faced as discipline broke down under harsh weather conditions. And while Summerville touches on Moore's stern but compassionate leadership style during the campaign, he does not mention much about how Moore developed as a leader or about his early experiences.

Individual soldiers' actions are well documented through published journals, letters, and books available over the past 195 years. The horrors of the retreat for soldiers and the families that followed them are rarely documented. If the book has a weakness, it is Summerville's reliance on published sources—little new material from unpublished and archival sources is available.

Summerville creates a highly readable, understandable book that describes challenges leaders face in expeditionary operations, including paltry intelligence about the enemy and the terrain and their allies' actions—an interesting parallel to our own current expeditionary doctrine. However, the book breaks no new ground. For those with a general interest in the Napoleonic wars or those looking for a first step into

the genre, this is a valuable place to start. For those familiar with the campaigns looking for new or unusual information, the book offers nothing new.

**Mark T. Gerges,**  
**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**THE PENTAGON AND THE PRESIDENCY: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush,** Dale R. Herspring, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2005, 490 pages, \$45.00.

Dale R. Herspring's book shows how the senior military command, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), has viewed the presidency since World War II. The book's topic is vital; its scope ideal. Including presidencies from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush, the book helps us get away from the stereotypical thinking that all conflicts are inherent in institutions and that all senior military people dislike all presidents.

Military personnel want a commander in chief who respects them, does not lie to them, listens sincerely to their concerns, and gives them unambiguous guidance. They also want a boss who takes responsibility when things go wrong. This might sound simple, but it is all too rare.

In the military's eye, George H.W. Bush was about as good a president as one could get. He was honest and open-minded, even in disagreement, although he did not always follow professional military advice. For example, he went from the strategic defense in Operation Desert Shield to the offense in Operation Desert Storm without giving Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell previous notice; Powell found out while watching a White House announcement on the morning news.

Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon were about as bad as presidents could get with the military. Johnson was outright insulting. Nixon was conspiratorial and circumvented the chain of command by issuing direct orders to operational units, confusing them

about what exactly they were supposed to do.

I welcome the book's topic, admire its scope, and value many of its insights, but I have some disagreement with its details. For example, the book says Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's "decision to stand up to Nixon and [Secretary of Defense Henry] Kissinger cost him a . . . tour as chief of naval operations." Six pages earlier the book says Zumwalt spent a full, 4-year tour as chief of naval operations from 1970 to 1974.

The book also claims David Hackworth "spent a lifetime creating and commanding Delta Force." This is actually true of Charlie Beckwith. Of greater importance, the book says General Omar Bradley and the JCS "recommended" the relief of General Douglas MacArthur. The author's source asserts the JCS "concurred." A better description is that the White House took the initiative, not the Pentagon.

The fact that I perhaps quibble about details underscores my high regard for a book that teaches us much about civil-military relations from the military's side of the picture. I am glad I read it.

**Michael Pearlman, Ph.D.,**  
**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**RESISTING REBELLION: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency,** Anthony James Joes, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2004, 351 pages, \$35.00.

Anthony James Joes presents an interesting analysis of counterinsurgencies that is appropriate for Army officers operating in today's environment. The central thesis is that "[g]uerrilla insurgency is quintessentially a political phenomenon and, therefore, any effective response to it must be primarily political as well."

Joes provides his insight to answer a number of questions, including: Why do guerrilla insurgencies arise? Who are they directed against? Who participates in these insurgencies? Who leads them? Who will oppose the

insurgents? What is the counter-insurgency record of the U.S? How does that record compare to those of the British, the French, the Soviets/Russians, and others? Are there replicable and nontrivial aspects common to successful or unsuccessful insurgencies and counterinsurgencies?

Joes frames his analysis from the multiple aspects of a political problem applied to several historical examples. The true value of the book is its overwhelming number of historical examples, both successful and unsuccessful, within each component of his analysis.

Joes offers elements of a counter-insurgent strategy to "establish the strategic environment for victory" and to "identify measures to disrupt and marginalize the guerrilla effort." He applies these principles to a strategy for South Vietnam and current operations in Iraq. Although

these two studies are afforded a short amount of attention, Joes' research provides a detailed basis for Army officers to gain an understanding and historical appreciation to enhance individual analysis of current operations from the tactical level to the strategic level.

**MAJ Jeffrey Starke, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**THE END OF THE BEGINNING: From the Siege of Malta to the Allied Victory at El Alamein**, Tim Clayton and Phil Craig, The Free Press, New York, 2003, 368 pages, \$27.50.


*The End of the Beginning* is the second collaboration between Tim Clayton and Phil Craig about the British experience during World War II. They also authored the highly acclaimed *Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain* (Simon &

Schuster, New York, 2000), which pays tribute to the British people's efforts during 1940. *The End of the Beginning* begins where *The Finest Hour* ends (in terms of critical events for the British during the war). Clayton and Craig key in on the period 25 May to 10 November 1942, when the British Army was gaining confidence in its leaders and itself.

The authors focus on the fighting between the British and the Germans from Tobruk to El Alamein, explore the British convoy operation (Pedestal) to Malta, and devote a chapter to the Dieppe Raid, shifting effectively between the levels of war. At one point they narrate a tank battle then shift to a critical meeting between Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Harry Hopkins (President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "point man" for the New Deal).

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The book, reminiscent of those written by the superb German author Paul Carell, would be a great companion to Carell's *Foxes in the Desert* (Bantam, New York, 1966), which looks at the North African campaign from the German point of view. But the book's true strength is its firsthand accounts.

While most authors look at the campaign through the eyes of British General Bernard L. Montgomery and German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Clayton and Craig look through the eyes of individuals who truly worked at the foxhole level, including Peter Vaux, a British division and corps intelligence officer who tries to get in the mind of Rommel; Ken Lee, a British fighter pilot who distinguishes himself throughout the war before being captured; Dougie Waller, a member of a British antitank company instrumental in the victory at the second battle of El Alamein; and Mimi Cortis, a nurse in Malta who describes her fears. The authors further personalize these individuals by including them in a photo section and an epilogue.

*The End of the Beginning* is a superb book for the general reader as well as for those well versed in the North African campaign. However, the book does not unearth any gems of research.

**LTC Rick Baillegeon, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**FOCH: Supreme Allied Commander in the Great War**, Michael S. Neiberg, Brassey's, Washington, D.C., 2003, 125 pages, \$12.95.

In the spring of 1918, at a moment of extreme crisis, Ferdinand Foch took over command of the Allied armies on the Western Front. Foch's leadership and indomitable will helped the Allies weather the German onslaught, and by the end of that same year, he directed the Allied counteroffensives that turned the tide and brought victory to the Allied cause. Yet Foch remains a little-known figure to many American students of military history. We tend to recall him primarily as one

of the advocates of offensive spirit who contributed to the bloodbath that engulfed the French offensives of 1914.

Single-mindedly aggressive, Foch was one of the few generals in modern history to show skill in leading a coalition war effort. For this reason and because of the central role Foch played in the war's final campaigns, Michael Neiberg's concise biography is a welcome addition to military history.

Neiberg emphasizes three aspects of Foch's character and behavior: his devout Catholic faith, his fiery patriotism, and his enduring commitment to political neutrality. Before World War I, Foch's religious convictions limited his career prospects. The fact that his brother was a prominent Jesuit priest caused Foch to lose an instructor job at the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, and later to be passed over for army chief of staff. Still, Foch's political neutrality allowed him to maintain the competence and drive necessary to earn a brigade command, then a corps, and finally, a subtheater command in the early campaigns of World War I.

Yet, like most World War I generals, Foch had no answer for the tactical stalemate that gripped the Western Front after 1914. His patriotism, his obstinate faith in the power of the offensive, and the attacks he sponsored in the middle years of the war yielded no more success than those of any other general. By 1917, he had fallen into disfavor. Surprisingly, however, at the beginning of 1918 the fiery old republican Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau overlooked Foch's religious beliefs and made Foch France's military representative on the Allied Supreme War Council. From this position Foch was called to act as Supreme Allied Commander, and carrying this title, he led the final victorious campaigns of the war.

Victory made Foch a hero, but it also made him a bitter man. He was incensed by the lenient terms of the Versailles Treaty and, abandoning his political silence, proclaimed famously: "This is not a peace.

This is an armistice for twenty years." For his prescience as well as his military achievements, Foch deserves to be remembered.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,  
Retired, Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas**

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**RETHINKING THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF PAKISTAN: The Price of Strategic Myopia**, Ahmad Faruqi, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, England, 2003, 190 pages, \$79.95.

Ahmad Faruqi, a gifted economist who has done great work on electrical and utility issues, is from Pakistan's educated elite, but he now works in California. He has never served in or with the military, but he writes regularly on military issues.

In *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia*, Faruqi argues that Pakistan is spending itself into ruin with its military. He believes Pakistan's hope for the future is to lay off 50 percent of its military forces and quit buying equipment abroad. Indeed, Pakistan is in rough economic and political shape and needs to do something. Knowing this, does Faruqi have the answer? Should you pay 42 cents a page to find out?

The book has some problems. First, it is a poorly blended compilation of previously published works that lacks coherence and organization. Second, the book was published in 2003 but was obviously written before 9/11. Faruqi made a few quick changes to try to bring the book up to date, but he did not do a comprehensive scrub and rewrite. A lot has changed in the region since 2001, particularly the military posture; the book has not. As you read, the Taliban is in power, then out of power, then in power again. Third, many of the charts, tables, and figures are not self-explanatory, and Faruqi does not explain them. Legends in some of the figures seem to be wrong or missing entirely. So, is this a bad book? No, but Faruqi has written better.



The Pakistani military is responsible only to itself and could use a periodic critical examination and shaking out. There is clearly room for improvement and a need for more transparency. The Pakistani military has a record of seizing the government from corrupt civilians but then running the country poorly for a time thereafter. Faruqi proposes to cure this with an innovative constitutional change whereby the military could temporarily seize control of the country in a constitutional coup to arrange for new elections.

A key player in a troubled region, Pakistan is having problems. Its stability and prosperity are clearly in the best interests of the United States, so the military professional should know more about the country. However, Brian Cloughley's *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000) and Owen Bennett Jones's *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2003) are better places to begin than with this pricey book.

**LTC Lester W. Grau, USA,  
Retired, Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas**

**ON HALLOWED GROUND:  
The Last Battle for Pork Chop  
Hill**, Bill McWilliams, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2003, 520 pages, \$29.95.

*On Hallowed Ground* narrates the exceptional story of the 7th Infantry Division's fight to hold Pork Chop Hill in Korea in early July of 1953. Elements of the division's 17th and 32d Infantry Regiments endured repeated assaults by Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) 3 weeks before the armistice was signed. Intrigued and haunted by this battle, Bill McWilliams explored its depths, his research taking him into the lives of the West Point Class of 1952. (Two classmates, Lieutenants Richard Shea and Richard Inman, were in the same unit and killed 2 days apart on Pork Chop Hill.)

Set against the backdrop of the Panmunjom negotiations, the story is one of dedication, courage, and sacrifice in the trenches, bunkers, and outposts. Because of its commanding positions on neighboring hills, the CCF was able to observe and map the bunkers and trenches being built on Pork Chop Hill. On 6 July, it launched its well-planned and overwhelming attack.

Although reeling from the initial onslaught, Alpha Company 1-17 Infantry managed to hold enough of the position to facilitate a counter-attack that gained back some of the hill, but the force quickly ran out of personnel as casualties mounted and gains had to be defended. This quickly became the pattern of the battle. American companies attacked and consolidated small gains while the CCF launched battalion-level counterattacks at night to recapture the positions. In the end, four major U.S. counterattacks, involving elements of five battalions spread over two regiments, failed to capture the hill. On the 5th day of bloody fighting, the American commanders made the decision to withdraw.

The book is extremely well researched. McWilliams uses a wealth of official command reports and command guidance (at that time secret) as well as written and oral recollections, intelligence summaries, de-briefings, battle record boards, and personal letters to paint a poignant portrait of men in combat. As with most recent histories, the book is interspersed with illuminating, first-person accounts that reveal the nature of the see-saw fighting as well as the fear of being surrounded, isolated, and possibly forgotten.

Ultimately, the book is a human story that highlights courageous small-unit leadership in the closing days of the war. What is striking about the story is how men were still willing to make sacrifices despite the possibility of the war coming to an end.

Not normally found in most battle histories, the stories of the soldiers' families are particularly poignant and McWilliams does

a commendable job portraying emotions and reactions as family members learn their sons and husbands are missing in action and then reported killed. *The Last Battle for Pork Chop Hill* is an excellent story, and McWilliams does a superb job telling it.

**LTC Robert Rielly, USA,  
Retired, Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas**

**UNCONDITIONAL DEFEAT:  
Japan, America, and the End of  
World War II**, Thomas W. Zeiler, SR Books, Wilmington, DE, 2004, 207 pages, \$17.95.

Thomas W. Zeiler's main reason for writing *Unconditional Defeat* was to educate the public about the devastating policies of the Japanese and American governments during World War II.

Japan's documented policy of ferocious hand-to-hand combat caused the Americans to adopt these same maneuvers to survive. The Japanese used such methods to sustain fighting as long as possible to protect and honor the Emperor. As the war was going badly for Japan, Japanese commanders urged their troops to fight to the death while killing as many of the enemy as possible. It was rare to take Japanese as enemy prisoners of war, and even when this did occur, the prisoner was so shamed by the prospect of being a prisoner that he often tried to commit suicide.

Because of the Japanese soldier's single-minded willingness to die, U.S. President Harry S. Truman had to decide between continuing a war that would literally kill thousands more soldiers or defeating Japan decisively with the atom bomb.

**1LT Rene De La Rosa, USA,  
Abu Ghraib, Iraq**

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helpful to understanding IO. His discussion of the importance of a product's ability to meet the needs of the consumers demonstrates the utility of the metaphor in relating the goals of an IO campaign (support of the military mission) to the methodology employed within the campaign. We welcome further discussion of the applicability of the marketing metaphor to Information Operations, especially discussion which highlights the potential for unintended consequences from its adoption. Storlie's discussion of the potential disconnect between the product and the marketers (a "slicker" copy of coalition activities" unrelated to the quality of the

security the coalition provides) is one possible consequence. Nevertheless, Storlie's letter provides ample justification for the validity of thinking about Information Operations in marketing terms.

Certainly, if our "product" does not meet expectations this will lead to inconsistent messages and declining credibility. Ideally, those officers who manage an IO campaign will not feel like "used car salesmen" because the product we offer meets the needs of our consumers. If our current Information Operations in Iraq are demonstrating a disconnect between the product we offer and the IO campaign that supports it, then a marketing

perspective should sensitize IO practitioners to this fact. It has obviously sensitized Storlie to be aware of the problem.

Storlie's letter further demonstrates the need within the IO community for marketing communication skills. His credentials indicate that he is perfectly suited for the role of Information Officer at any operational level. Unfortunately, his biography of experience in Iraq appears to support our further assertion that the Army continues to overlook marketing skill as a requisite for assignment to IO positions.